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Treatment over objection:
minds, bodies and
beneficence
Sameer P. Sarkar* and Gwen Adshead**
“The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as
we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian
of his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual”
John Stuart Mill – On Liberty1
Introduction
This quote from Mill highlights an important distinction for medical ethics: a distinction between
bodily and mental health. In this paper, we want to look at the ways that ethics and law have
addressed this distinction, especially in relation to involuntary treatment. We will claim that both
philosophy and case law appear to address involuntary treatment for physical disorders in very
different ways to involuntary treatment for mental disorders; and will relate these differences in
analysis to different approaches to understanding the capacity to make autonomous decisions. 
Voluntary and involuntary treatment.
The bioethics literature generally has privileged the place of patient autonomy in medical decision
making: a position perhaps best summed up by Judge Cardozo in Schloendorff: 2
“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body, and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.” 
There are two key issues here; first, that the privileging of autonomy rests on a finding of
‘soundness of mind’; second, that any intervention by the doctor that does not reflect the patient’s
autonomous agreement is an assault. By extension, where there is ‘unsoundness of mind’, the
patient’s right to choose for himself may be undermined, and therapeutic interventions may (a) be
performed without consent, and (b) will not then constitute an assault in legal terms. 
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This extended argument is bourn out by existing legal approaches. Any non-consensual treatment,
unless legally sanctioned. will be liable to damages as per existing Tort laws. Changes to the legal
concept of ‘consent’ have led to shifts in the application of judicial sanctions3; including notions
such as “informed” consent, proxy consent, best interest, and substituted decision making.
Consent is defence to assault; where there has been consent, there can be no injury4.
Underpinning the concept of consent lies the concept of capacity or competence. Confusingly
these terms may reflect either the legal or the clinical concept, depending on which side of the
Atlantic it is being discussed; in this paper we use the term competence to refer to the psychological
construct underpinning a legal concept of capacity. As suggested above, lack of capacity has been
understood as justifying involuntary treatment, or at least undermining a right to consent before
treatment. The question of involuntary treatment has been most widely explored in relation to
people with mental illness, whose competence to make autonomous decisions may be impaired by
that illness. Most countries have legislation that provides a legal measure setting out the conditions
under which it is lawful to impose involuntary assessment, detention or treatment for a mental
illness.
Such measures frequently cause controversy among jurists, clinicians and academics in mental
health law. Most jurisdictions proscribe any prolonged deprivation of liberty of citizens; so that
(for example) in the US and Europe, involuntary detention and treatment may contravene both the
14th Constitutional amendment in the USA, and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Some have argued that such involuntary treatment constitutes a paternalistic intervention in the
lives of those who are merely socially deviant (5,6cf Kittrie, 1971; Szasz, 1960); or even, that
involuntary treatment for mental disorder represents the most severe intrusion by the state into
individual civil liberties, short of criminal charge and conviction. Such a view points out the
similarities between responses to deviance as a consequence of illness, and criminal deviance, in
that both deprive the individual of his or her liberty, usually involve forced residence in an
impersonal institution, and subjection to control by others which may entail loss of dignity
(7Goffman, 1961).
In the case of forced treatment, a person may also be subjected to physical coercion and even
intrusion; both of which may be experienced by the individual as humiliation or even punishment.
The tremendous power differential between the recipients and providers of mental health care
makes freedom to choose an illusion, even when it is ostensibly voluntary8. Finally, it has been
argued that (a) it is difficult to make mental health diagnoses which would justify any intervention,
and (b) that distressing mental experiences do not constitute a health ‘disorder’ at all; (we will not
explore this argument further in this paper, referring the interested reader to Fulford, 1989 for a
review9).
3 Paul S. Appelbaum. Almost a Revolution–Mental
Health Law and Limits of Change, Oxford University
Press. 1994. 
4 Feinberg,J. Harm to others. Oxford OUP. 1984
5 Kittrie,N. Right to be different. Viking Press 1971.
6 Szasz,T. (1960) The myth of mental illness. American
Psychologist; 15: 113–118 
7 Goffman,E . Asylums. London, Penguin . 1961
8 McCubbin M., & Cohen D. (1996) Extremely
Unbalanced: Interest divergence and power disparities
between clients and psychiatry. Int J. of Law and
Psychiatry , 19, 1–25
9 Fulford,K.W. Moral theory and medical practice.
Cambridge, CUP. 1989
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The counterarguments in support of involuntary treatment for mental disorder are briefly: 
(a)  that mental competence can be lost for health reasons, and 
(b)  that an individual’s lack of mental competence to make decisions for himself is a
justification for benevolent intervention by others, and
(c), further, that loss of competence, being a harm in itself, should not result in further harms
or the prevention of benefits10. 
Such paternalistic arguments assume that where there is absent or diminished capacity to make
decisions, a duty to benefit others takes precedence over autonomy, and that there is only limited
over-riding of autonomy. Thus, both the wrong and the harm done to the individual are minor.
Further, involuntary treatment is almost always used as a last resort, when there is not only a
demonstrated need but also when there is the potential for harm without it. Although such weak
paternalism does limit autonomy on the grounds of beneficence, the harm or wrong done by
denying autonomy is offset by the harm that would have been if the choices of an incompetent
person were honoured, or if no choice were made at all. For these reasons, competence underpins
legal capacity to consent to health care decisions; absence of competence/capacity is a justification
for state intervention on the grounds of parens patriae, a legal notion whereby power is exerted by
the state on behalf of its citizens.
Perhaps what is most striking about these arguments are the underlying assumptions that mental
disorders uniformly render patients incompetent to consent, and that physical disorders do not.
Factors that might limit competence have not been explored in the same detail, other than mental
illness. Nor has there been the same attention paid to those situations where individuals refuse
treatment for physical disorders. As a result, there have been several legal cases which have pushed
the theoretical debate, in both the USA and England. Before, reviewing those cases, we consider in
more detail the legal and philosophical aspects of capacity.
Autonomy, Competence and Capacity
Competence and capacity are legal and psychological concepts, which in turn are closely
conceptually related to the philosophical concept of autonomy, which entails (arguably) both a
psychological competence to choose for oneself, and the experience of a self that chooses. One
requires a competence to be autonomous; to achieve what Berlin describes as ‘positive liberty’11. 
Autonomy may not have a single coherent meaning; Feinberg12 suggests that there are four:
(i)  the capacity to govern oneself;
(ii)  the actual condition of self-government;
(iii)  an ideal of autonomy, derived from (ii); and
(iv)  the authority to govern oneself.
Within medical ethics, this fourth aspect arguably underlies both the principle of respect for
autonomy and the privileging of that principle13. Gillon14 has suggested that it may be helpful
10 Buchanan,A & Brock,D Deciding for others: the ethics
of surrogate decision making. Cambridge, CUP. 1989
11 Berlin,I Four essays on Liberty. Oxford OUP 1971
12 Feinberg,J Harm to self. Oxford OUP 1986
13 Beauchamp, T & Childress,J Principles of biomedical
ethics. Oxford OUP 1994.
14 Gillon,R. Biomedical ethics. BMA books. London,
1985
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(certainly in the medical domain) to consider autonomy of will, thought and action as separate
capacities. Christman15 distinguishes the psychological capacity for autonomy (P–C autonomy)
from the right against actions which undermine P–C autonomy (R autonomy).
Christman’s distinction may be a helpful way to think about the distinction between consent to
treatment for physical disorders, and consent to treatment for mental disorders. Respect for
autonomy in relation to treatment for physical disorders seems to privilege R–autonomy, whereas
in relation to mental disorder, it is assumed that P–C autonomy is so compromised that 
R– autonomy is not a consideration. We will return to discuss this further.
Autonomy and others
Respect for autonomy is reflection of the respect for individual freedom, which Mill believed would
produce the greatest happiness for individuals. But Mill’s emphasis on liberty is arguably only
relevant in isolation and not in the company of others16. It has been argued that the traditional
concept of autonomy is too individualistic and does not take into account normal human
experiences of dependence and need for others.17 Similarly, autonomy is likely to be a
developmental capacity that has a lifespan trajectory, and may change over time; there may be
different types of autonomy at different stages of the life span. This shifting nature of autonomy is
most obvious in relation to children and adolescents where the developing child’s autonomy is
located in a network of relationships with carers, and only emerges over time18,19. This notion of a
nested or located autonomy is similar to that described by Agich as ‘interstitial autonomy’. Such 
N (or network) autonomy is located in the psychological spaces between people in relationships
with each other, where their experience of themselves is profoundly affected by those relationships. 
A more complex account of autonomy could have significant implications for the ways we look at
ethical and legal dilemmas in mental health practice. One of us has argued elsewhere that an
approach to ethical reasoning, which locates the actor in a relational context rather than a rights
based approach, may offer different and more complex solutions20. In contrast, the law in
AngloSaxon jurisdictions such as the US and the UK tends to reflect a traditional individualistic
approach to autonomy, as exemplified by the legal notion of capacity to make choices. Such legal
capacity is individually based, and is a categorical decision (either one has capacity or one does
not21). There is some acknowledgement that different decisions require different capacities; e.g. the
legal test of competence to make a will (which is a criteria based test) is different from the legal test
of competence to get married (which is a status based test).
15 Christman,J(1988) Constructing the inner citadel:
recent work on the concept of autonomy. Ethics,
109–124.
16 “ We are not isolated free choosers, monarchs of all we
survey, but benighted creatures sunk in a reality whose
nature we are constantly and overwhelmingly tempted to
deform by fantasy”– Murdoch, “Against dryness”, in S.
Hauerwas and A. Macintyre (eds.) Revisions:
Changing perspectives in Moral Philosophy . University
of Notre Dame Press 1983 at p. 49.
17 Agich,George A . Autonomy and longterm care. Oxford
OUP. 1993
18 Josselson,R-E. The space between us. Josse-Bass. 1992
19 Sutton,A. (1997) Autonomy in adolescents. Journal of
Medical Ethics. 23: 26–31
20 Adshead,G. A different voice in psychiatric ethics. In
Parker,M & Dickeson,D (eds.) The Cambridge medical
ethics work book. Cambridge, CUP. 2000. pp 185–190.
21 Kennedy,I & Grubb,A. Textbook of Medical Law.
London, Butterworths. 1994.
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Autonomy and rationality
Mill’s account of autonomy also presupposes rationality, where rationality means the privileging
of reason over emotion. Although the descriptive splitting of thinking and feeling as separate
psychological functions has a long conceptual history, there is less evidence to support such a split
than may be supposed. Affects generate thoughts, and thoughts generate affects; thinking and
feeling are processes which need to operate as a psychological matched pair. If either are out of
kilter, then the other will be affected; the relationship is symbiotic rather than hierarchical.
Rationality therefore presupposes a functioning capacity for both affects and cognitions; it will not
be possible to be rational where there is dysfunction of either process.22
Rationality and autonomy have been closely linked conceptually; hence the general and traditional
assumption that the mentally ill lack autonomy, because they lack rationality. Rationality includes
the logical capacity to make judgements and decisions, and it is generally assumed that the presence
of a mental illness compromises the ability to make decisions of any kind. In fact, it might be
argued that one of the symptoms of mental illness is an inability to make decisions for oneself; a
loss of an ability to govern oneself is a diagnostic criterion in its own right.
It is however not so clear that all types of mental illness do compromise all types of autonomy, or
diminish all capacity to make any decisions23. There is increasing evidence that people with mental
illnesses do retain capacity to make all sorts of decisions, including consent to treatment and
research. The problem remains that others may not like their decisions, and this subjective reaction
may lead to a questioning of capacity24. What this suggests is that the test of rationality applied is
one that relates to the supposed motivations behind the decision25 or the comprehension and
acceptance of the reasons given for the decision26.
Many important life decisions for people involve a low threshold for decision making competence.
In English law, for example, one need only be 16 to choose to have heterosexual intercourse, or to get
married. One has to be aged 18 to vote; this decision, one might argue, is a less complex decision than
either of the previous two, which involve judgements about complex interpersonal relationships over
time. One need be only 16 to make decisions about health care; later legal modifications to this are
discussed below. Given that tests of competence for these decisions are generally set very low, it
seems anomalous to set them higher on the basis of an individual’s history of mental disorder. 
It might be argued that the consequences may be potentially very serious, if the wrong decision is
made; but this argument would apply also to individuals with physical disorders also. 
It could be argued that any type of disorder, physical or mental, compromises autonomy to some
degree. Although the distinction between will, thought and action looks attractive, psychologically
these are likely to be overlapping domains; and someone with what might be thought to be a purely
physical disorder may well find that their sense of themselves as autonomous has been altered or
compromised27. Something of this difficulty can be seen in relation to patients’ experience of
22 Charland, L. (1998) Is Mr Spock mentally competent?
Philosophy, Psychology & Psychiatry, 5:67–81.
23 Grisso,T & Appelbaum,P . Assessment of competence.
CUP 1998 
24 Roth,L et al. (1982) The Dilemma of denial in the
assessment of competency to refuse treatment. American
Journal of Psychiatry 139: 910–913
25 Matthews,E . Mental and physical illness: an
unsustainable separation? In Eastman,N & Peay,J (eds.)
Law without Enforcement. Hart Publishing, Oxford.
1999 pp 47–59.
26 Culver,CM & Gert,B. Cited in Buchanan and Brock
(supra). p 66.
27 Sacks, O. A leg to stand on. Simon & Schuster, New
York, 1998
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giving informed consent in general medical practice, where it is clear that although the procedure
of informing patients has taken place, patients do not retain information, and may be hazy about
the implications of the consent procedure. Similarly, a study by Appelbaum28 found that a
significant proportion of apparently competent people could not distinguish between
participation in research and therapy.
Legal approaches to capacity: English and US law
Consent to treatment
We have suggested that both mental and physical disorders may have an impact on the capacity to
make good quality decisions about health care. We have emphasised this issue because it appears
that the legal approaches to capacity differ in relation to physical and mental disorder. We turn
now to review some relevant legal cases.
Consent is defined as the voluntary and continuing permission of patient to receive a particular
medical treatment. It is based on knowledge of the nature, purpose, likely effects and risks of that
treatment including the likelihood of its success and any alternatives to it. Consent should be freely
given (i.e. in the absence of duress or inducements) and includes the right to refuse treatment.
Valid consent is that which is given by a person with the capacity to make a treatment choice. Right
to self-determination in adults with capacity generally prevails over any countervailing state
interest29. In relation to the consent of children, a majority decision in the case of Gillick30 held that
age alone did not make one incapacitated to consent; and parental authority has to give way when
capacity is established, based on the maturity of the individual child.
American law has utilised a concept of ‘informed consent’, which entails competence, disclosure,
understanding, voluntariness and consent31, all of which must be present for consent to be legally
binding. We concentrate here on the legal criteria of competence and understanding, and relate
these to more general accounts of tests of capacity to consent. Broadly, these are– 
(a) the ability to make and express a decision
(b) to actually understand the information presented and alternatives 
(c) to rationally manipulate the information and appreciate the implications of alternative
choices and 
(d) to make a reasonable decision. 
US and British tests are fairly similar; English law criteria include the ability to understand, retain
and believe information.32,33 English common law allows a competent individual to decline
treatment under the same broad general principles as in the US; the test for capacity to refuse
treatment appears to be same as consenting to treatment.
28 Appelbaum PS et al (1987) False hopes and best data:
Consent to research and therapeutic misconception.
Hastings Center Report. Apr.: 20–24
29 Home Secretary v. Robb [1995] 1 All ER 677
30 Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health
Authority and another [1985] 3 All ER 402
31 Beauchamp and Childress goes further to add
recommendation of a plan in the information part.
Authorisation of the chosen plan then becomes similar to
expression of consent. Similarly, refusal of consent has to
be read as decision against a plan. – Principles of
Biomedical Ethics – 4th Ed. Oxford University Press.
1994 
32 Re C (Adult) (Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1
WLR 290, sub nom C (Refusal of Medical Treatment)
[1994] 1 FLR 31
33 Clauses 1 to 5 of a draft of a Bill annexed to the Law
Commission report No 231 on Mental Incapacity.
1995.
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Absence of consent: who decides?
Previous cases have highlighted the need to make clear the role of third parties or the state in giving
consent to treatment for those who cannot give consent for themselves, either permanently or
temporarily. In re B,34 the House of Lords found that medical treatment in the absence of consent
was not an assault if the treatment were in the patient’s best medical interests (as defined with
reference to a professional medical standard). However, they noted that there might be some
treatments that had such social significance (such as sterilisation) that the treatment decision could
not be left to the medical profession, but a court opinion should be sought. Several subsequent
cases have further defined ‘socially significant’ treatments, and the role of the court. 
The English courts have therefore favoured a medical justification for proceeding in the absence of
consent. In contrast, the American courts have tended to favour the notion of ‘substituted
judgement’ i.e. others make a judgement for the incompetent individual. Yet this is not
straightforward. In Saikewicz,35 the Massachusetts Supreme Court reviews the concept of
substituted judgement; and argues that it involves ascertaining the incompetent person’s actual
wishes and preferences. However, they also suggest that the decision should be:
‘that which would be made by the incompetent person, if that person were competent, but
taking into account the present and future incompetency of the individual as one of the factors
which would….be part of the decision making process’.
In the case of Quinlan36 however, the New Jersey Supreme Court indicated that the views of others
close to the individual could substitute for the views of the incompetent patient; which seems to
support a less atomistic view of a person’s choices. 
Various legal measures have been proposed for dealing with cases where there is lack of capacity.
A process of substituted decision making was supported by the Law Commission37 and the Expert
Committee recently reviewing English mental health legislation38. The Law Commission has also
supported advance directives and ‘living wills’, which express previously given consent as if it were
given now, even if currently incapacitated. Lord Goff in Bland39, and British medical codes of
practice, have clearly stated that advance refusals (directives) are as valid40 as the advance
statements.41 Once established as authentic, due respect must be given to such an advance directive.
However, such directives are not binding on the professional nor are they effective in the case of
treatment refusal for mental disorder if the patient is detained under the Mental Health Act 1983
and is subject to the provisions of Part IV of that Act.
34 Re B (a minor) (wardship:sterilization) [1987] 2 All ER 206
35 Superintendent of Belchertown State school v.
Saikewicz. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
1977. 373 Mass.728, 370 N.E.2d 417.
36 In Re Quinlan. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1976. 70
N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647.
37 Law Commission– Report on Mental Health Incapacity 1995
38 Department of Health (1999) Review of the Mental
Health Act 1983: Final Report of the Expert
Committee . Department of Health, London. 
39 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821.
40 For an advanced directive to be valid and enforceable,
the following has to be satisfied (BMA Code of
Practice, infra note 41):
(a) advance instructions are clear and unambiguous as
to what is to be done (or not done) and under what
circumstances
(b) at that time he is legally competent to do so
(c) the document should be witnessed
(d) been made fully aware of the risks, alternatives etc.
(e) circumstances are exactly similar, verified by
independent health carer(s)
Also see Richard Jones Mental Health Act Manual
(2001) (Sweet and Maxwell – 7th edition) Para I–630.
41 BMA Code of Practice on Advance Statements about
Medical Treatment – Report of the British Medical
Association – BMA 1995
112
Journal of Mental Health Law July 2002
The capacity to refuse treatment: physical disorders
In most jurisdictions, a competent treatment refusal must be respected by health care teams. 
This stance reflects not only the respect for autonomy described above, and the privileging of
autonomous decisions, it also recognises that there are decisions that are more important than
medical ones. Such an approach has been reflected in legal decisions on both sides of the Atlantic.
The cases are often tragic ones; for example, the case of AK, a 19 year man with ‘locked in
syndrome’ who refused further treatment, knowing this would result in his death.42 Some cases
have involved refusal of treatment on religious grounds.43
However, the key issue here is that of how to conceptualise the competence to make such a
decision, especially where the foreseeable consequences are risky to the individual concerned. It
has been argued that the more serious the consequences, the greater the degree of capacity which
needs to be demonstrated. Counterarguments have emphasised the right to make decisions that are
unpopular with others, especially in the domain of quality of life and living. Such debates have
naturally found most relevance in relation to refusal of treatment that leads to death. Interestingly,
the American courts have suggested that the right to privacy includes the right to die. 
When treatment refusals have been contested by third parties, the courts have paid close attention
to the competence of the patient, and generally assumed that the capacity to consent is the same
as the capacity to refuse. In Yetter,44 the court found that if the refusing patient was aware of the
possible consequences of her refusal of treatment then this should be respected, even though it
might be considered ‘unwise, foolish or ridiculous’. In both re C and re B, the Courts found that a
patient detained in a mental hospital, suffering from a mental disorder, could still make a
competent treatment refusal, which must be respected; and in re T,45 Butler-Sloss LJ stated (at 664),
‘the decision to refuse medical treatment by a patient capable of making the decision does not
have to be sensible, rational or well considered’ (emphasis added).
However, this approach has not been consistently supported in relation to one group of competent
patients: pregnant women who refuse Caesarean section. Even where the competence of the
patient is not in doubt, women have been legally compelled to have surgery in order to save the
life of their unborn child.46 In St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S,47 the mother was compelled to
have the surgery; at appeal, Judge LJ said this: 
‘the autonomy of each individual requires continuing protection even, perhaps particularly
when the motive for interfering with it is readily understandable, and indeed to many would
appear commendable’.
But as Wicks suggests, it is hard to know if this principle would still have been respected if the
patient had not been coerced, and subsequently died. In these cases, one must conclude that the
clinicians and the courts have been more influenced by the perceived risky consequences than the
principles of respect for autonomy. However, the extent to which professional anxiety may
42 re AK [2000] 58 British Medical Law Review 151
43 In re Osborne District Court of Columbia Ct of
Appeals, 1972. 294 A.2d 372
44 In re Yetter Court of Common Pleas of Northampton
County, Pennsylvania, Orphans Court Division, 1973.
62 Pa.D.& C.2nd 619.
45 Re T (Adult refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All
ER 649 
46 Wicks, E (2001) The right to refuse medical treatment
under the European Convention on human rights.
Medical Law Review, 9: 17–40. 
47 St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S. [1998] 3 All
ER 688 
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compromise good quality decision making is not anywhere discussed; just as AK’s feelings about
his terminal illness are also not discussed. There appears to be a distinction operating about the
experience of psychological distress: In relation to a physical condition, it is rational,
understandable and does not compromise competence, but in relation to a mental condition,
psychological distress is neither rational nor understandable, and does compromise competence. 
The capacity to refuse treatment: mental disorders
The situation with regard to treatment refusal is very different if this is in the context of mental
disorder. Under current English law, a detained patient may not be legally able to refuse treatment
for a mental disorder under certain conditions. There is no requirement to show that the patient
lacks capacity to make a treatment decision, (unlike the approach taken above where a
determination of capacity is essential); only that they suffer from a ‘mental disorder’ (a status test). 
‘Medical treatment’ is defined in the English Mental Health Act 1983 as including ‘nursing and also
includes care, habilitation and rehabilitation under medical supervision’48, broadly the range of
activities aimed at alleviating or preventing deterioration of the patient’s mental disorder. It also
includes physical treatment such as Electro-convulsive Therapy (ECT) and the administration of
drugs and also Psychotherapy. 
Two sections limit the administration of involuntary treatment. There are treatments of a
particular kind, administration of which needs special safeguards because of their very nature or
effects (such as psychosurgery or hormone implants). Section 57 of the English Mental Health Act
requires for these types of treatment both the patient’s expressed consent and a second opinion.
For ECT or prolonged drug treatment, either consent or a second opinion is required under
Section 58. 
All other treatment not specifically falling under sections 57 and 58, can be given without the
patient’s consent, even when capacity is retained. This would include a variety of therapeutic
activities with a variety of staff, psychological and social therapies. Only involuntary treatment for
mental disorder therefore covers such a wide range of interventions; no such treatments can be
given involuntarily for physical disorders.
However, new advances in medicine highlight some of the difficulties there may be in making such
a distinct separation between mental and physical disorders. Certain drugs, used for both physical
conditions and mental conditions, can have different status under consent provisions. An example
would be Propranolol. Originally a drug for heart conditions; it is used for treatment of anxiety.
When used as such, it falls under Section 58. When the same drug, in similar dosage is
administered for Lithium49 induced tremor or akathisia50, it is not legally necessary to obtain
consent or subject it to Section 58 because the treatment will be for a neurological condition, not
a mental illness. 
48 Mental Health Act 1983 Section 145
49 a mood stabilizer – used in treatment of manic
depressive illness among others
50 a condition of motor and psychic restlessness, usually but
not exclusively a side effect of certain anti-psychotic
medications
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New and controversial interventions have been added to the list of treatments for mental disorder,
which can therefore be given in the face of a flat refusal. These include restraint51,52, involuntary
Caesarian section53 and tube feeding54; all of which have been deemed by courts to be treatment for
mental disorder. Treatment has even been extended to include assessment55. 
Such decisions reveal striking anomalies in the way that the English courts have dealt with
treatment refusal in relation to mental disorder and physical disorder. Consider tube feeding as an
example. An ordinary person who decides to starve themselves to death (for example, a prisoner),
or a terminally ill person who is not eating during the final stages of life, cannot be force fed against
their will. It may be that if they become incompetent to take a treatment decision (e.g. when they
become unconscious) that treatment may be given in the absence of their consent as described
above.
If, however, food-refusing individuals can be deemed to be suffering from a mental disorder, then
they can be force fed, even if they are deemed to be competent. The ‘not eating’ is understood as
a symptom, which is secondary to the mental disorder, and forced feeding is the appropriate
treatment for that symptom. This was the case in B v. Croydon Health Authority where, although B’s
treatment refusal was deemed to be competent, she could be force fed in the face of her refusal
because she was detained for treatment of a mental disorder. Compare this with the stopping of
feeding of those with terminal illnesses, where the loss of appetite is secondary to the physical
disorder, but a previously expressed wish to forego treatment for the physical disorder can be
accepted.
In the case of suspected mental disorder, the judiciary appears to abandon autonomy as the
overriding value in relation to consent, and instead favour beneficence, in the form of treatment
intervention. In these cases, English courts seem to have favoured a medical ‘best-interest’ model;
consistent with the courts approach to consent in children, where, even if Gillick competent, best
interests was once again held to be all prevailing56.
Mental and physical disorder : autonomy and risk
As described above, courts seem to take a wide definition of treatment for mental disorder, which
includes treatment for the physical symptoms of that disorder. The courts have reasoned that to
take any treatment interventions out of context will be ‘too atomistic a view’57. They appear to have
taken the view that involuntary treatment may be given for any physical condition which is
‘integral’ to the mental disorder of the patient.
What is then not clear is what ‘integral’ means in this context. The courts seem to be arguing that
where the physical symptoms can be understood as related to the mental disorder, even indirectly,
then treatment for the symptoms will be treatment for mental disorder, and thus can be given under
current law. However, this position is not consistent with the view (held in both C and B) that the
51 Tameside and Glossop Acute Services Trust v CH
[1996] 1 FLR 762, (1996) BMLR 93 
52 Herczegfavly v Austria [1992] 15 EHRR 437 
53 Tameside supra note 51
54 B v. Croydon Health Authority [1995] Fam 133. [1995]
2 WLR 294, [1995] 1 All ER 683, [1995] FLR 470,
CA
55 B v. Barking Havering and Brentwood Community
Healthcare NHS Trust, Court of Appeal [1999] 1
FLR, 106 Lord Woolf MR at 114 E
56 Re. W (A Minor) (Court Jurisdiction) [1992] 3 WLR
758 at 769
57 Tameside supra note 51
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presence of a mental disorder does not necessarily compromise all an individual’s decisions. People
can apparently split off different aspects of their experience, especially decision making capacity,
and possess full competence, even where there is serious physical and/or mental disorder.
The distinction which is being made here seems to rest on the assumption that the presence of any
mental disorder globally affects all decision making, so all decisions are rationally suspect and do
not reflect a ‘true’ decision of that person. In addition, physical symptoms arising from treatment
refusal in cases of mental disorder are therefore also symptoms of mental disorder; psyche and
soma are ‘integral’ to each other. In contrast, physical disorders are not assumed to affect mental
processes in a global way, or indeed in any way. No matter how physically symptomatic the patient
is, nor however risky the consequences, his mental capacity to make a treatment refusal can be
reliably separated from the effects of his physical disorder; psyche and soma are dis-integrated. 
Does it make sense to distinguish mental and physical disorders as different entities in relation to
capacity? It might be argued that the chronicity of some mental disorders does affect autonomy in
ways that differ from physical disorders which often occur in discrete episodes. As Agich has
argued58, the ethical issues raised by the delivery of long term care are different from acute care.
Agich has argued that “chronic illness involves suffering as a mode of existence” and the definition
fits most models of mental illness and certainly personality disorders. Chronic illness is not
treated, it is managed. Chronic illness thus has to be discussed along a different axis, one which is
complementary to liberal theory, not inimical to it59. Agich’s argument is that, there are differing
levels of autonomy, there must be different levels of capacity. But there is no reason why this
argument should not also apply to chronic physical disorders. As autonomy shrinks in any sort of
chronic illness (mental or physical), so competence to make treatment decisions may be restricted.
By implication, legal capacity may also be reduced and parens patriae powers become more
prominent.
As Winick60 suggests, a strong distinction between mental and physical illness in terms of capacity,
not only treats those with mental illnesses as lesser citizens in terms of autonomy and consent, but
can also have a stigmatising effect on therapeutic relationships for both patients and mental health
staff. Research by the MacArthur foundation has found out perceived coercion is common in all
forms of psychiatric hospitalisation, and treatment and legal status is not an accurate indicator of
perception of coercion.61. This perception of coercion itself interferes with competence. Valid
consent, by most moral and legal definitions has to be free, so that consent obtained under any
form of duress is not true consent, but assent. Arguably, a patient who has just been made subject
to ‘compulsion’62 has had a large part of his voluntariness eroded; which in turn must undermine
58 Agich, George A. Chronic Illness and Freedom. 
In Carson R, Barnard D, Toombs K, eds. Chronic
Illness and the Humanities. Indiana University Press.
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New York: Oxford University Press. 1993
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DC 1994
61 Monahan, J., Lidz, C., Hoge, S., Mulvey, E., Eisenberg,
M., Roth, L., Gardner, W., & Bennett, N. (1999).
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MacArthur studies. In J.Morrissey, and J. Monahan
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International Perspectives. Stamford, Connecticut: JAI
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his competence to make decisions. The very coercive nature of detention63 or compulsion makes
any discussion of voluntariness in consent theoretically redundant. If autonomy is all or none,
then ‘Choice’ is all and ‘Compulsion’, none. Any further negotiation based on capacity merely
reinforces Agich’s point that autonomy is graded and negotiable.
Legal reasoning
Perhaps legal approaches to capacity reflect a traditional split in Western cultures, which since the
17th century have seen reason as a property of mind, which is distinct from passions or emotions,
which are the property of the body64. If the mind is disturbed everything is disturbed; if the body
alone is disturbed, reason can still prevail over physical sensation and feeling. Unfortunately, there
is not much evidence for this traditional view. Instead, there is increasing evidence that physical and
mental disorders have similar, but limited effects on capacity in different ways for different people. 
It might be argued that if any physical disorder could compromise autonomy and competence,
then it might be justifiable to over-ride refusal on paternalistic grounds in the traditional way.
Bartlett and Sandland65 have expressed legal concerns in relation to overturning treatment refusal,
fearing a ‘post-modern world where the limits are constantly receding as one approaches it’.
Montgomery has gone so far as to suggest that the way is paved by Tameside to treat physical
disorders without consent as long as they are related to the mental disorder. Such alarm is probably
unfounded as there is existing case law66,67 preventing medical treatment for physical disorders when
capacity is retained, and Montgomery’s related68 is not the same as Goff LJ’s integral69. Nevertheless,
the frequency with which these matters appear before the courts suggest that health care
professionals are concerned about the extent they will be responsible for the ‘risky’ decisions of
others. This concern reflects a more general question about the responsibility of health care
professionals to abolish all medical risks. In relation to mental health, the concept of ‘medical risk’
appears to have been expanded to include risks to third parties, not just risk to self.
Scotland has recently passed an Incapacity Act70 that will provide measures for treatment and care
of all those who lack capacity to consent to treatment, whether as a result of physical or mental
disorder; it remains to be seen whether English law will follow suit. A similar approach to consent
based on capacity was recommended by the Richardson Committee in relation to the treatment of
mental disorders. The Committee accepted the need for compulsory treatment but only where
there was demonstrated incapacity. Loss of autonomy would be balanced with increased claims to
care through the principle of reciprocity71. 
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However, this proposal was rejected by the current English government72. In contrast, the
Government’s proposal was that loss of autonomy for the mentally disordered was justified with
reference not to lack of capacity but risk (to self or others). Similarly, American outpatient and
inpatient commitment procedures (for compulsory treatment for mental disorder) are judicially
determined and dangerousness based. The American system of judicial determination for
commitment has at least three models; Exceedingly non-interventionist73,74, minimal intervention75
and maximum protection, all dealing with question of risk. In the state of Massachusetts, where
the Rogers76 case was heard, state law has been changed to reflect maximum intervention although
as Appelbaum has shown, the theoretical possibility of maximum protection has not matched with
the practical outcomes, which still remains deferential to medical advice77.
Arguably, the judiciary has been increasingly inclined towards granting the very paternalism which
the state seeks78. The pendulum has swung back from extreme liberalism to a parens patriae model.
If that is the case, the liberty interest can be seen in a different light as arguably a type of negative
liberty (pace Berlin): the freedom from psychosis79 including any risk arising from that illness. 
It seems that freedom from exposure to any kind of risk is perceived as a medical benefit, which
could and should trump claims to autonomy by the mentally ill; an argument which is not applied
to the physically ill.
Conclusion
It appears that people with a mental illness diagnosis are still regarded as having limited or no
capacity to refuse treatment for mental disorder, (including the physical consequences of that
mental disorder) on the grounds of risk. Patients with severe physical disorders are however seen
generally as being competent to refuse treatment for their physical condition, even where the
outcome is highly risky for them. 
Current societal attitudes are towards transparency and respect for persons. In the UK, this has
been reflected in the adoption of the Human Rights Act 1998, almost 50 years after the signing of
the European Convention on Human Rights. Achieving a delicate balance between the State’s
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legitimate interest in preserving life, and the individual’s claim to autonomy even in risky
situations, is a process which may be best left to the courts. Most of our current legal trends have
flown from the other side of Atlantic, albeit very slowly. Only time will tell if Appelbaum’s
observation on the pendulum swinging back will continue in that tradition.
Perhaps we need a better analysis of what it is to be a person in the company of others. We also
need a better conceptual grasp of risk: how it is socially perceived and tolerated, and the
management of risk when social anxiety increases. If as a society we are becoming increasingly
intolerant of risk, we are likely to be particularly so in relation to mental disorder, where there is
a perception that risk can be measured and controlled. However, what this may mean is that
patients with mental disorders are not allowed to make the same sort of risky decisions that people
without mental disorders are allowed to make: either in relation to their own health or the health
of others.
